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S CIENTISTS will long debate the extent to which our climate is changingas a result of anthropogenic releases of greenhouse gases. But the debate
over whether the earth is experiencing climate change-and in particular, global
warming-is pretty much over.' And if even the more modest estimates of the
potential consequences of global warming prove true, including the loss of coral
reefs, the disruption of ocean currents, and the loss of the Greenland and polar ice
sheets, our window of time to get a handle on this problem is short-
unrealistically short given political realities.
Much good work is being done to address climate change and its
consequences both at the policy and technology levels. On the policy side, state
and local governments are leading the way with ambitious and innovative plans
to cut greenhouse gases by as much as 80% over the next fifty years. Among the
more ambitious plans, the State of California has adopted legislation that is
designed to reduce carbon emissions in that state by 25% below 2006 levels (to
1990 levels) by 2020,2 but a budget crisis in California has put that target in
jeopardy. Moreover, as ambitious as California's target might seem, it would
not even meet the targets established under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which
would have required the United States to reduce CO2 emissions to levels 7%
below 1990 levels by 2012.4
* Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado
Law School. I would like to thank my research assistant, Stuart Gillespie, for his helpful assistance
in drafting the article.
1. Dan Vergano, The Debate's Over: Globe Is Warming, USA TODAY, June 12, 2005,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-12-global-warming-cover x.htm.
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2010) (colloquially known as AB 32). See
also Press Release, Office of the Governor of Cal., Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark
Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/41 11/.
3. See Jim Downing, Fiscal Impact of State Climate Law Disputed, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct.
19, 2009, at 18A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/2009/10/19/2262347/fiscal-impact-of-state-
climate.html.
4. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998),
available at http://unfecc.int/kyotojprotocollitems/2830.php.
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change.... [The] Protocol ... sets binding targets for 37
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Technology promises to increase the efficiency of our cars, appliances,
buildings, and power plants, and to provide new ways to generate electricity that
minimize or eliminate greenhouse gases, or provide for their sequestration
underground. Despite all of these encouraging signs, however, it is hard to see
how our current efforts will be adequate to achieve the level of progress
necessary to stabilize and reduce greenhouse gases within the short window of
time available, especially given the significant growth in greenhouse gas
emissions in developing countries-most notably China and India.'
The problem is serious, perhaps dire, but it is not insoluble. Several
potentially "game-changing" technologies are showing real promise.6 Moreover,
even without these technologies, if we demanded the efficiencies we know we
can achieve, and if we committed ourselves to applying off-the-shelf solutions
that are already available, we could stabilize and reduce greenhouse emissions,
and we could do it in time to save the planet.7
So why are the prospects for a near-term solution so dim? Put simply, the
problem is with our political institutions. Our current political machinery is
poorly constituted to address a problem that arises slowly and incrementally, and
whose most serious consequences will most likely occur many years in the
future.8 Just as we seek scientific and technological innovations, we need to find
industrialized countries and the European community for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. These amount to an average of five per cent against 1990 levels over the five-year
period 2008-2012.
Id. The full text of the Kyoto Protocol is available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/kpeng.pdf. The United States was not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and therefore is
not bound by its terms.
5. See Jad Mouawad & Julia Werdigier, Warning on Impact of China and India Oil Demand,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/business/07cnd-
energy.html.
6. Among the more promising is the "traveling wave reactor"-a nuclear reactor that can use
the waste from existing nuclear plants-and that can run continuously for up to 100 years on the
same fuel. Press Release, Intellectual Ventures, Introducing Traveling-Wave Reactors, available at
http://www.intellectualventures.com/docs/terrappower/IV Introducing%20TWR_3_6_09.pdf (last
visited Apr. 19. 2010). Another technology garnering much attention is the new generation of fuel
cells made from common materials and pioneered by companies like Bloom Energy. See Press
Release, Bloom Energy, Bloom Energy Debuts Advanced Fuel Cell to Provide Clean, Reliable, and
Affordable Power 24/7 (Feb. 24, 2010), http://c0688662.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/
downloads-pdf-release-bloom-launch-2-24-2010_1.pdf. See also Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed,
Dreaming the Possible Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010 (describing specifically the Bloom
Energy fuels cells as well as a process by the Calera Corporation to turn CO2 emissions into
calcium carbonate, which then can be used for construction).
7. It might well be a different planet. NASA's James Hansen has recently observed that "[i]f
humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed and to which
life on Earth is adapted, paleoclimate evidence and ongoing climate change suggest that CO 2 will
need to be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm." James Hansen et al., Target
Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOsPHERic Sci. J. 217, 217 (2008),
available at http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2008/2008_Hansen-etal.pdf.
8. The same might be said for our corporate institutions, which increasingly seem to focus on
short-term gains over long-term security. The 2008-2009 Wall Street crisis was arguably triggered
by pressure to make short-term gains without regard for long-term consequences. Bill George,
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new decision-making models that can overcome the infirmities of our current
political system.
This article describes the weaknesses in our existing institutions and the
characteristics of a model that might overcome them. It begins with a review of
climate science and the range of expected outcomes under various scenarios.
This is followed by a review of technological innovations and possible future
innovations that could, if implemented, stabilize and then reverse current
greenhouse gas emission levels. It then looks at current efforts to address climate
change and suggests why those efforts will almost certainly fall short of what is
needed. Finally, the article examines political institutions and explains why
current governance models are likely to fall short of what is needed to address
climate change.
For reasons that have nothing to do with climate change, politics and
political campaigns are increasingly about present problems and short-term
solutions. Yet climate change is mostly about future problems that can be solved
only with far-sighted programs. Moreover, even accepting that a political
consensus will follow the scientific consensus on the need to address climate
change, rent-seeking behavior on the part of various, competing interest groups
make it unlikely that the Congress or the executive branch will accomplish more
than modest, incremental changes to current policy. Such changes will not be
adequate to avoid the grim consequences of climate change. Nonetheless, if we
acknowledge the seriousness of the global warming problem we can construct a
decision-making model that overcomes the limitations inherent in our political
institutions, and develop a plan that allows us to transform our energy
infrastructure in a way that might just preserve the planet. It is a daunting task,
and we don't have much time, but it can be done.
II. THE STATE OF CLIMATE SCIENCE
While our scientific knowledge will never be perfect, we know enough
about climate science to know that we are nearing the tipping point for some
catastrophic and potentially irreversible changes in climate. Antarctic ice core
data provides a CO 2 record for the past 400,000 years.9 Natural background
levels of CO2 in the atmosphere have historically fluctuated roughly between 180
and 280 ppm (parts per million). 0 These levels correspond with the natural cycle
of warmer and colder periods including ice ages and the warmest interglacial
periods." The natural cyclical temperatures have subsequently influenced the
amount of vegetation producing and consuming natural background levels of
CO2-'
2
Focus on Short-Term Hurts Companies, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703363704574503452362482292.html.
9. J.R. Petit et al., Climate and Atmospheric History of the Past 420,000 Years from the
Vostok Ice Core, Antarctica, 399 NATURE 429, 429 (1999).
10. Id. at 433.
11. Id. at 431-34.
12. Id. at 429.
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Since the Industrial Revolution, atmospheric CO2 has risen sharply. It
surpassed the historical barrier of 280 ppm sometime around the turn of the
twentieth century, reaching 360 ppm at the turn of the twenty-first century. 3
Atmospheric CO2 is now projected to hit 400 ppm before 2030.14 These
increases in atmospheric CO2 can be traced not only to burgeoning fossil fuel use
but also to the unprecedented destruction of historically important carbon sinks. 5
The solution will likely require a reversal of both of these trends.
The long-term risks associated with CO2 and other greenhouse gases
depends to a large extent on their persistence or "residence time" ("RT") in the
atmosphere. 16  The IPCC estimates that CO 2 has a residence time in the
atmosphere of between 5 and 200 years.17 If the actual RT is on the higher end,
then we will be living with the impact from today's CO 2 emissions for many
years to come.'8 Global temperatures will rise in direct correlation to rising
levels of CO 2, which correlate directly with increases in carbon emissions.'
9 One
study predicts a range of global warming over the next 100 years at about 1.20 to
2.3oC for CO2 levels of 450 ppm, 1.50 to 2.9
0 C for CO 2 levels at 550 ppm, and
1.70 to 3.2oC, for CO 2 levels at 650 ppm. 20 The graph below from the Arctic
13. Over the past 50 years alone, CO2 has increased from 316 ppm to more than 388 ppm as
recorded by the Mauna Loa research station in Hawaii. See Earth Sys. Research Lab., U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/
#mlofull (last visited May 12, 2010) (monthly mean data on C02 from Mauna Loa, Hawaii).
14. Id.
15. Couplings Between Changes in the Climate System and Biogeochemistry, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 499, 512
(S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-
wgl-chapter7.pdf.
16. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Glossary of Climate Change Terms, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/glossary.html#R (last visited May 12, 2010).
17. See Technical Summary of the Working Group I Report, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE
SCIENTIFIC BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 21, 38 tbl. 1 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001),
available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc tar/wgl/pdf/WGl_TAR-FRONT.pdf. Which side of
the line anthropogenic C02 falls on, of course, makes a huge difference in our ability to address the
problem. If it is closer to five years, as one scientist has argued, then our ability to reverse current
C02 concentrations in the atmosphere is obviously much higher. Robert H. Essenhigh, Potential
Dependence of Global Warming on the Residence Time (RT) in the Atmosphere of
Anthropogenically Sourced Carbon Dioxide, 23 ENERGY & FUELS 2773, 2773 (2009), available at
http://climateresearchnews.com/2009/08/atmospheric-residence-time-of-man-made-co2/.
18. See Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 1295, 1316 (2009).
But see Essenhigh, supra note 17, at 2773 (suggesting that the RT for bulk CO2 is only about five
years).
19. See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUPS I, II & III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 26 & figI.1. (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipec.ch/pdflassessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
20. Projections of Future Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS,
supra note 17, at 525-82. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) somewhat more
conservatively estimates that the global average surface temperature will increase by 1.8 degrees
Celsius by the end of the 21st century for CO 2 levels of 600 ppm, 2.4 degrees for CO 2 levels of 700
892 [Vol. 41
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Climate Impact Assessment shows the dramatic change in CO2 levels in recent
years and the implications of this trend for global temperatures. 2 1 Note how
closely the rise in carbon emissions tracks the rise in CO2, which tracks the rise
in global temperatures. Note also the importance of residence time to the long-
term trends on the graph. Even if CO2 emissions were entirely eliminated
tomorrow, the amount of CO2 in our atmosphere would not likely change for
many years. And since, such emissions will not be eliminated any time soon, the
trend of CO 2 and temperature will inexorably be upward for many years to come.
1000 Years of Changes in Carbon Emissions,




This 0-year record tracks the rise in
carbon emissins due to heman activIties
alssil tel hurning and land clearing) and
the subsequent Increase In atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentrations, sand air
temperatures. The ealIer parts of the
Northera Hemisphere temperature reconstruction
are derived from historical data,
tree ringe, and corals, while the later parts
ware directly measured, Measurements of
carbon dioxide (02) ns air hobbles trapped
laVe cores orm th eadier part ofthe
C2 record; direct atmospheric measurements
of CO2 concentration began in 1951
Q2004C r M
Rising temperatures at the levels currently predicted may well have
catastrophic ecological and social consequences. Coral bleaching offers an early
indicator of climate impacts because coral reefs are thought to thrive in climate
conditions that are close to their thermal limits for existence. 22 If average global
temperatures rise more than loC, annual bleaching would likely cause significant
adverse impacts to coral reefs worldwide.23 Rising temperatures will also
to 800 ppm, 2.8 degrees for CO2 levels of 850 ppm, 3.4 degrees for CO 2 levels of 1250 ppm, and 4
degrees for CO 2 levels of 1550 ppm. CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 19,
at 45 tbl.3.1.
21. ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (ACIA), IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2004), available at http://www.amap.no/acia/.
22. Brian C. O'Neill & Michael Oppenheimer, Dangerous Climate Impacts and the Kyoto
Protocol, 296 SCIENCE 1971, 1971 (2002), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/
296/5575/1971.pdf.
23. Andrew C. Baker, Reef Corals Bleach to Survive Change, 411 NATURE 765, 765 (2001).
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increase the melting of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets.24 This will lead to
rising sea levels. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment predicts a sea level rise
of 10-90 cm by the end of the twenty-first century (about 4-35 in). 25 The rate of
rise will accelerate as the century progresses and even larger increases in sea rise
are expected over the long term. A sea level rise at the higher end of current
estimates will likely have disastrous consequences for small island nations and
other low elevation areas. In the United States, the impacts on Florida from a
one meter rise in sea level would be especially dramatic.26 But the most
significant impacts will likely be felt in Southeast Asia. For example, the United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts rising sea levels
will devour 17% of Bangladesh by 2050, displacing at least 20 million people.27
Our ability to stabilize CO 2 levels at 450 ppm or some lower level
2a while
minimizing economic and social dislocations will be severely compromised the
longer we delay action. Jim Hansen, the NASA scientist who was censored by
the George W. Bush White House for speaking out about climate change, 29 has
argued that we have just ten years to reduce greenhouse gases before global
warming reaches what he calls a tipping point and becomes unstoppable.3 The
24. James Hansen, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb, Sci. AM., Mar. 2004, at 69, 74.
25. Key Finding #2: Artic Warming and Its Consequences Have Worldwide Implications,
IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC, supra note 21, at 42.
26. Id. at 43.
27. Matt Wade, Rising Sea Level Settles Border Dispute, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Austl.)
Mar. 25, 2010, available at http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/rising-sea-level-
settles-border-dispute-20100324-qwum.html (citing the IPCC). See also Rex Victor Cruz et al.,
Asia, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 484 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapterl0.pdf.
Projected sea-level rise could flood the residence of millions of people living in the low lying
areas of South, South-East and East Asia such as in Vietnam, Bangladesh, India and China.
Even under the most conservative scenario, sea level will be about 40 cm higher than today
by the end of 21st century and this is projected to increase the annual number of people
flooded in coastal populations from 13 million to 94 million. Almost 60% of this increase will
occur in South Asia (along coasts from Pakistan, through India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to
Burma) ....
Id. (internal citations omitted).
28. Building on a speech by James Hansen at the American Geophysical Union meeting in
2007, author Bill McKibben started an organization called 350.org with a stated goal of stabilizing
global carbon at 350 ppm. See Mission, 350.org, http://www.350.org/mission (last visited Apr. 15,
2010). McKibben's case for 350 ppm was first made in an editorial in the Washington Post that
appeared on December 28, 2007. Bill McKibben, Remember This: 350 Parts Per Million, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 28, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
12/27/AR2007122701942.html. Hansen's position on global carbon is described at Hansen et al.,
supra note 7.
29. Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert Says NASA Tried to Silence Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2006, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/science/earth/29climate.html.




next section addresses society's technological ability to address climate change
before it is too late.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE
When people think about technological solutions for climate change, they
usually focus on mitigation, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change ("IPCC") defines as, "[a]n anthropogenic intervention to reduce the
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases." 31 Efforts to mitigate climate
impacts are a key part of any possible solution and are described in detail below.
But geoengineering solutions offer an entirely different set of technological
options for addressing climate change. Geoengineering refers to the "deliberate
large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract
anthropogenic climate change." 32  While geoengineering solutions are often
viewed as an option of last resort, discussions about geoengineering have become
more prominent in recent years as reality of the climate change challenge has
become better understood. Technological solutions that fall into this second
category of options are addressed separately below.
A. Mitigation
Few who have studied the climate change problem would likely deny the
serious possibility that it could wreak catastrophic consequences on the earth; but
the situation is not hopeless. If we can marshal the will to address the problem,
practical, cost-effective solutions to mitigate the impacts of climate change are
available using conventional technologies or strategies that are both cost-
effective and readily available. Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow from
Princeton's Carbon Mitigation Initiative have described fifteen existing
technologies or "wedges" that could each prevent one billion tons a year worth of
carbon emissions by 2054.34 If just seven of these technologies were employed
to their full potential, atmospheric carbon could be stabilized at a relatively
Michael D. Lemonick, Global Warming: Beyond the Tipping Point, SCI. AM. (SPECIAL ISSUE), Oct.
2008.
31. Klein, R.J.T. et al., Inter-Relationships Between Adaptation and Mitigation, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 27, at 750, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapterl 8.pdf. The IPCC study
contrasts mitigation with "adaptation", which it defines as "adjustment in natural or human systems
in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits
beneficial opportunities." Id. While we will no doubt need to develop adaptation strategies to deal
with the climate change and its myriad effects, this article focuses strictly on mitigation and
geoengineering strategies.
32. THE ROYAL SOCIETY, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND
UNCERTAINTY 1 (2009),http://royalsociety.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=10768.
33. See Carbon Mitigation Initiative: Stabilization Wedges Introduction,
http://cmi.princeton.edu/wedges/intro.php (last visited May 12, 2010).
34. Id.
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modest level of 500 ± 50ppm. 35 The technologies identified as having the ability
to act as a "wedge" are divided into three categories-efficiency, decarbonization
of energy generation, and carbon sinks. These three categories are briefly
outlined below.
Efficiency. The four wedges in this category emphasize the very simple
idea that the less energy generated the less carbon produced.
* Achieve better fuel economy in motor vehicles
* Reduce use of motor vehicles
* Improve efficiency of buildings
* Improve generation efficiency at baseload coal plants3
Decarbonization of Energy Generation. The nine wedges in this category
emphasize limiting the amount of carbon produced in the actual generation of
energy.
* Substitute natural gas for coal
* Capture and store carbon produced at coal plants
* Capture and store carbon at hydrogen plants
* Capture and store carbon at synthetic fuel plants
* Substitute nuclear power for coal
* Substitute wind power for coal
* Substitute photovoltaic solar power for coal
* Produce hydrogen with wind power for use in fuel cell vehicles
* Substitute biomass fuel for fossil fuel
Natural Sinks. The two wedges in this category emphasize human impact
on natural systems. Forest management promotes the protection and promotion
of the most effective carbon sink-forests. Agricultural management makes the
point that the destruction of grasslands for agricultural purposes must occur with
an understanding that such actions have significant consequences to carbon
emissions.
* Reduce deforestation and increase reforestation, afforestation, and
new plantations37
* Employ conservation tillage to all cropland38
35. S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next
50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 968 (2004), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/305/5686/968.pdf.
36. Doug Roberts, Jr. & Michael Johnston, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 30, 2009, at All. See
also Baseload, EnergyVortex.com, http://www.energyvortex.com/energydictionary/baseload
base loadbaseload demand.html (defining baseload).
37. See Afforestation, Reforestation, and Deforestation, LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, AND
FORESTRY: A SPECIAL REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5-6
(Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/spm/srl-
en.pdf (defining the terms afforestation, reforestation and deforestation).




The possible results of the approach suggested by Pacala and Socolow are
described in the two graphs set forth below.39 The first graph shows what is
likely to happen with carbon emissions under a "business as usual" ("BAU")
scenario. The WRE 500 line illustrates how carbon levels can be stabilized at
















2010 2020 2000 2040 2050 2060
Year
39. Pacala & Socolow, supra note 35, at fig. 1. For more background on the Pacala/Socolow
approach, see Stephen Pacala, Profile, http://theclimategroup.org/our-news/interviews/
2004/10/15/stephen-pacala (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
40. See Tom M.L. Wigley, Stabilization of CO 2 Concentration Levels, in THE CARBON CYCLE
258 (T.M.L. Wigley & D.S. Schimel eds., 2000) (scientifically explaining the carbon stabilization
effects).
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second graph, in particular, shows why they describe their recommendations as
"wedges." Importantly, the wedge approach highlights for decision-makers a
relatively simple strategy for achieving ambitious greenhouse gas targets.
The ideas offered by Pacala and Socolow, of course, are just a starting point.
As new technologies come on line and new ideas emerge many more wedges can
be added to the mix, and the options for addressing climate change will become
more robust and more economical. That does not, of course, ensure that they will
be implemented, but it does suggest a path forward if we can find the institutional
capacity to address climate change in a meaningful way. If not, we may
increasingly be looking at geoengineering solutions, even as we learn to adapt to
the changing climate that we will inevitably face.
B. Geoengineering
As noted previously, geoengineering refers to the "deliberate large-scale
manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate
change."41 More and more, strategies for manipulating our climate are becoming
part of the policy debate. The most prominent study to date was published by the
British Royal Society in 2009.42 Importantly, it addresses not merely the
scientific questions raised by geoengineering but also the important international
governance issues as well. Because of the potential importance of
geoengineering to developing a credible, long-term program to address climate
change, it is addressed separately here.
As described by the Royal Society, geoengineering encompasses two
distinct types of activities-carbon dioxide removal ("CDR") and solar radiation
management ("SRM").44 While some activities that arguably fit within the scope
of geoengineering, such as avoiding deforestation, are not controversial, other
methods such as ocean fertilization and the SRM method of injecting sulfate
aerosols into the lower stratosphere to mimic the effects of volcanic eruptions,46
41. THE ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 32, at 1.
42. See generally id.
43. See id. at 4.
44. SRM describes methods to either deflect sunlight or to increase the reflectivity (albedo) of
the atmosphere, clouds or earth's surface, thereby reducing the net incoming short-wave (ultra-
violet and visible) radiation received. Id. at ix.
45. Id. at 17.
46. The injection of sulfate aerosols into the lower stratosphere would reduce the amount of
short-wave thermal radiation entering the earth's atmosphere by scattering sunlight back into space.
Here is how it might work. Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) or sulfur dioxide (SO2) could be introduced
into the stratosphere as gases. These gases would oxidize into sulfate particles with a diameter of
approximately several tenths of a micron. This process would mimic the introduction of
volcanogenic sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere by a volcanic eruption. The cooling influence of
this process is the result of incoming solar radiation reflecting off of the sulfate aerosols back into
space (increasing planetary albedo). The eruption of Mount Pinatubo, for example, resulted in a
peak global cooling of approximately 0.5 K. Due to the stability of the stratosphere, the lifetime of
such aerosols is long-on the order of years-thus illustrating the potential risk associated with
unanticipated consequences or over-correcting climate impacts. Id. at 29-31.
[Vol. 41898
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raise far more serious ethical and international governance questions because
their impacts are uncertain and they may be difficult to control.
The Royal Society's 2009 report, titled Geoengineering the Climate, states a
"likely" preference for mitigation efforts over geoengineering, 47 and for carbon
dioxide removal methods over solar radiation management,4 8 in large part
because of the ethical and political questions that geoengineering raises.4 ' The
report, however, calls for further study of all means for addressing climate
50change, including geoengineering.
Among the concerns with geoengineering identified by the Royal Society is
the "moral hazard" problem that it poses:
The very discussion of geoengineering is controversial in some quarters because of
a concern that it may weaken conventional mitigation efforts, or be seen as a "get
out of jail free" card by policy makers.... This is referred to as the "moral hazard"
argument, a term derived from insurance, and arises where a newly-insured party is
more inclined to undertake risky behaviour than previously because compensation
is available. In the context of geoengineering, the risk is that major efforts in
geoengineering may lead to a reduction of effort in mitigation and/or adaptation
because of a premature conviction that geoengineering has provided "insurance"
against climate change.s5
Beyond the moral hazard problem, the international community may find it
difficult to control individual actors. As the Royal Society notes, some of the
riskier geoengineering options in terms of long-term global impacts, such as iron
fertilization of oceans and the injection of sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere,
"are likely to be affordable to a nation of modest means, or even to a very
wealthy individual."52 While principles of international law, such as the duty to
avoid transboundary harm, are reasonably well recognized and could arguably be
brought to bear to help regulate geoengineering,53 it is hard to imagine that a
47. Id. at 39 ("For reasons both of justice and the moral hazard argument, mitigation is likely
to be preferable to geoengineering. However this does not necessarily rule out geoengineering,
especially at the research stage, where a consequentialist case in favour can be made.").
48. Id.
Many of the ethical issues associated with geoengineering are likely to be specific and
technology-dependent. For example, small-scale, familiar, and reversible methods are likely
to be preferable ethically to those that are inherently large-scale, irreversible and
unencapsulated. This suggests that the engineered carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods
may be more ethically acceptable than SRM or ecosystem based methods.
Id.
49. Id. at 37-45 (explaining the ethical and political questions surrounding geoengineering).
50. Id. at 57.
51. Id. at 37.
52. Id at 40.
53. The Royal Society specifically mentions four treaties that encompass this duty, including
the Convention on Biodiversity Conservation, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), and the United
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small island nation facing inundation will be swayed by such principles. An
international agreement could help address this problem and persuade the most
vulnerable countries to participate, but only if it establishes an aggressive
program to study, and if necessary, deploy, appropriate geoengineering
technologies.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL MODELS
FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE
Few problems are so plainly global as climate change. While countries
contribute to climate change at widely varying rates, no single country can on its
own solve the problem. Anthropogenic sources of CO 2 and other greenhouse
gases are myriad and ubiquitous, and extraordinary efforts to control those
emissions in any one country cannot prevent and could even encourage higher
emissions in other countries. Moreover, climate change will cause disparate
impacts on countries. Small island nations and countries with large tracts of low
lying land could face inundation, while lands in cooler climates might see longer
growing season and increased agricultural productivity.
Given the international character of the problem, an international solution
might seem imperative. But climate change also poses a classic collective action
problem. 54 Since no individual nation can solve the problem on its own, the least
cost solution to the problem requires that all nations cooperate and equitably
reduce their CO2 levels. Unfortunately, because no nation can count on the
cooperation of all others, rational nations will opt for the next best solution,
which is to defect, or refuse to reduce their CO 2 emissions at all. The likelihood
that countries will defect is especially high where, as with climate change,
countries will experience the consequences of climate change at widely disparate
rates. Put another way, countries likely to suffer less, or perhaps even benefit
from climate change, have much less incentive to cooperate. In the context of
climate change this portends disaster.
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)). The Society goes on to suggest the
following:
States are not permitted to conduct or permit activities within their territory, or in common
spaces such as the high seas and outer space, without regard to the interests of other states or
for the protection of the global environment. This has the twin prongs of imposing on states
the duty to prevent, reduce and control transboundary pollution and environmental harm
resulting from activities within their jurisdiction and control; and the duty to cooperate in
mitigating transboundary environmental risks and emergencies, through notification,
consultation, negotiation and, in appropriate cases, environmental impact assessment (Birnie
et al. 2009).
Id. Nonetheless, it is fair to ask whether a state facing inundation will or even should honor these
duties.
54. The classic exposition of the collective action problem is found in MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1-3 (1971). This
problem is sometimes illustrated through an example described as the prisoner's dilemma. See
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-10, 206-07 (1984).
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This is not to say that an international agreement should not be vigorously
pursued, for such an agreement can certainly play an important part of an overall
climate change strategy. But an international agreement is unlikely to be
sufficient on its own and additional efforts will be needed at the national,
regional, and local level. As complex as it might seem, a multi-level political
strategy seems both necessary and possible. The United States' failure to support
the Kyoto Protocol, for example, led to a number of regional, state and local
efforts that have thus far proved far more ambitious and influential than anything
yet accomplished in the United States at the national level.
So it seems most appropriate to consider what can be accomplished both
practically and politically at every level of government and to ask whether a
comprehensive policy can be pieced together from the disparate units of
government that are willing to play a role. We at least have a moral obligation to
try.55 The next section lays out some of the political obstacles to addressing
climate change before considering viable options and possibilities.
Notwithstanding the collective action problem described above,
international institutions have some capacity to make cooperation a more viable
option for confronting climate change. But a comprehensive international
solution will almost certainly require one or more significant technological
advances. The Montreal Protocol, which successfully scheduled the elimination
of the most harmful substances that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer, worked
in large part because the number of manufacturers of ozone-depleting chemicals
was relatively small and substitutes became readily available and cost effective.56
A comprehensive and effective international program to reduce greenhouse gases
will not be achieved so easily. Unlike ozone-depleting chemicals, greenhouse
gases have many more sources that will be much harder to regulate and control.
Moreover, powerful interest groups from the coal lobby, to the oil and gas
industry, to the automobile and electric utility industries have an enormous,
short-term economic stake in preserving the status quo.
While environmental groups might be effective in counterbalancing some of
these lobbying efforts, public choice theory suggests that the concentrated
industrial interests opposing stringent regulatory standards to address climate
change will likely overcome the more diffuse public interests.57 Moreover, "free
riders" who will rely on the actions of others seem inevitable given the global
and dispersed nature of climate change, and the fact that its impacts will vary
55. Former Vice President Al Gore has famously described climate change as a moral issue in
the documentary, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Specialty Films 2006), available at
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0497116/quotes ("I don't really consider this a political issue, I
consider it to be a moral issue.").
56. See Anne Lucia Plein, A Story Between Success and Challenge-20th Anniversary of the
Montreal Protocol, 11 N.Z. J. ENvTL. L. 67, 68, 74-75 (2007).
57. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "Multiple
Use" Failed, 18 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 405, 407-08 (1994) (internal footnote omitted) ("'Public
choice' theory predicts that small, well-organized special interest groups will exert a
disproportionate influence on policymaking. This prediction is particularly relevant in the case of
public lands, where the interests of disorganized, distant public owners are regularly overshadowed
by the opposing interests of locally concentrated commodity interests.").
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greatly by region and by varying ability of people to adapt. Thus it seems
unrealistic to think that an effective and comprehensive climate change
agreement can be adopted at the international level within the roughly ten-year
time frame for action before we are forced to face some of the more serious and
possibly irreversible consequences of climate change.
Unfortunately, the prospects for effective legislation at the national level are
equally grim, even assuming that each of the nations representing the largest
greenhouse gas contributors were serious about addressing the problem. The
same private forces that make a comprehensive international agreement unlikely
are arguably even more powerful at the national level. Still, if the United States
were able to develop and implement a comprehensive and effective climate
change program other countries would surely take note, and international
competition might well spur these other countries meet or even exceed U.S.
efforts. So, an effective U.S. program could have a powerful international
impact. But an effective program seems very unlikely unless we can identify and
deploy a decision-making model capable of overcoming the forces that are
aligned against the systemic changes that will likely be necessary to confront the
challenges posed by climate change.
As Pacala and Socolow have shown, we have the ability to achieve
ambitious CO2 reduction goals that should be adequate to avoid the most
troublesome consequences of climate change with practical, off-the-shelf
technologies and programs. And we can see the glimmers of further hope from
some of the promising new technologies that are currently being developed. But
we seem to lack the institutional capacity to adopt and implement the necessary
"wedges" and programs that will be necessary to successfully confront climate
change.
Under the current prevailing political structure that promotes rent-seeking
and "free-rider" behavior on the part of interested parties, the likelihood of
persuading political leaders and government agencies to take anything more than
modest action to address climate change is distressingly low. Even when
confronting serious societal problems, political change comes slowly, and
government action usually proceeds incrementally. But for climate change, time
is not on the side of society, and incremental change will likely prove inadequate
to the task. The challenge then is to enact aggressive legislation quickly.
The story of the federal Clean Air Act offers an example of the typical
approach to government action, and it helps to illustrate why that approach will
not be adequate to tackle climate change. The basic structure of the modern
Clean Air Act was adopted in 1970. The law set a goal of achieving ambient air
quality standards across the country by roughly 1975. In 1977, after that
deadline passed without achieving that initial target, the deadlines were extended
to 1987, and for some pollutants, until 1992.59 In 1990, after the 1987 deadline
had passed amid continuing air quality violations, the deadlines were extended
58. Milestones, Mobile Source Emissions, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/oms/
invntory/overview/solutions/milestones.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
59. Summary of the Clean Air Act, Laws & Regulations, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/caa.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
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yet again.o In the case of Los Angeles, for example, the deadline for achieving
ozone pollution standards was extended to 2025.61 To be sure, some of the
ongoing ambient air quality problems relate to the EPA's decision to set more
stringent standards for certain pollutants.62 But forty years after the Clean Air
Act was passed more than 125 million peole still live in areas that fail to meet
health-based ambient air quality standards.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Clean Air Act has not achieved the lofty
goals set back in 1970, most would probably agree that the Clean Air Act has
been largely successful in improving air quality, even if those improvements
have taken much longer than originally planned, and even if those improvements
have been incremental and remain partially unfulfilled.
A very similar story could be told about the United States' success in
improving water quality under the Clean Water Act. Even while we can count
some significant success in improving water quality, serious problems remain,
and progress has taken much longer than anyone anticipated when the Clean
Water Act was first enacted.64
The incremental approach that yields modest but real success over a long
period of time may be sufficient for addressing more conventional problems, but
if we fail to do enough to address climate change in a timely way, we may hit a
tipping point that will make it impossible to restore the natural order.6 5 Thawing
of Arctic permafrost, for example, is expected to release massive quantities of
60. Overview-The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Clean Air Act, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/caaaoverview.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
61. See CAL. EPA, PROPOSED EMISSION REDUCTION PLAN FOR PORTS AND GOODS MOVEMENT
IN CALIFORNIA app. G at G-8, G-12 (2006), http://www.arb.ca.gov/planning/gmerp/march21plan/
appendixg.pdf.
62. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Seeks Tighter Rules to Cut Down Air Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/science/earth/08smog.html.
63. See Air Quality Trends, Air Trends, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/aqtrends.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006) ("[I]t is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters be eliminated by 1985."). Not only have we failed to come anywhere close to
achieving that goal, some water quality problems remain intractable. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALIfY ASSESSMENT REPORT (305(b) Report to Congress),
http://iaspub.epa.gov/waterslO/attains-nation_cy.control#total _assessedwaters (last visited May
13, 2010). One of the most egregious examples involves "mountaintop removal" coal mining
whereby an entire mountaintop is removed to expose and mine the coal seam. Despite clear
requirements in the Clean Water Act to prevent stream degradation, the federal Office of Surface
Mining, with the blessing of the EPA, has for many years allowed mining companies to bury miles
of streams with the waste rock taken off the mountaintops. New guidance from EPA is designed to
prevent the most egregious examples of this abuse, but it remains to be seen how effective these
new standards will be. See Memorandum, Improving EPA Review of Appalachian Surface Coal
Mining Operations Under the Clean Water Act, National Environmental Policy Act, and the
Environmental Justice Executive Order (Apr. 1, 2010), available at
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2010_04_01_wetlandsguidanceappalach
ian mtntopmining detailed.pdf.
65. See, e.g., Lemonick, supra note 30.
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methane gas,66 a greenhouse gas estimated to be at least twenty times more
potent than carbon dioxide.6 7
Despite the dire consequences predicted by some of the global climate
models, it seems likely that our existing government institutions are not up to the
task of addressing the problem in a timely fashion. Indeed, the debate in the
United States over national climate change legislation itself suggests that we will
at best follow the traditional, incremental approach, and that this approach will
not likely achieve the greenhouse gas reductions in the relatively short term
emissions that most experts believe will be necessary to avoid a catastrophic
result. Even the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, arguably the most
profound national event in decades, have failed to galvanize the government to
act quickly and decisively.68  Our only hope is to find a different institutional
model that is capable of overcoming the political and practical obstacles that
typically prevent transformative government action.
V. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS CAPABLE OF ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE
Commentators have recognized for a number of years that a different model
might be needed to tackle climate change. Some have suggested, for example,
that climate change policy makers should look to the Marshall Plan and its
success in providing the financial means to rebuild Europe after World War 11.69
66. Michael D. Lemonick, More Warming Worries: Methane from the Arctic, TIME.COM, Mar.
4, 2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1969767,00.html#ixzz
OirfghF35. See also Martin Heimann, How Stable Is the Methane Cycle?, 327 SCIENCE 1211
(2010), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/327/5970/1211 (claiming that the
East Siberian Arctic Shelf, long thought to be an impermeable barrier sealing in methane, is
perforated and is leaking large amounts of methane into the atmosphere).
67. See Methane, Climate Change, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/methane/
(last visited May 13, 2010).
68. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISsION REPORT 35 (2004), http://govinfo.1ibrary.unt.edu/91 1/report/91 1Report.pdf
(explaining how communication between federal agencies during the terrorist attack on September
11, 2001 was ineffective; most federal agencies learned of the attacks through the television
broadcasts on CNN). See also Carrie Johnson et al., Obama Vows to Repair Intelligence Gaps
Behind Detroit Airplane Incident, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/29/AR2009122901433.html?sid=
ST2009122902788.
From his vacation spot in Hawaii, the president blamed lapses in information-sharing after
Abdulmutallab's father alerted the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria last month about his son, who
had embraced radical views and cut off ties with his prosperous family. Government officials
said they already have identified faulty systems and failures to follow procedure, and Obama
has demanded preliminary results of a review by Thursday.
Id.
69. UN Report Proposes New Marshall Plan to Promote Development and Save the Planet,




Others have argued that we need the equivalent of the Manhattan Project -
something that could push the envelope on scientific knowledge as was done to
develop the atomic bomb.'
While substantial new funding, financed perhaps by a greenhouse gas tax or
emission fee, will surely be needed, and while research initiatives capable of
commercializing breakthrough technologies are critical to any successful effort,
such efforts alone are unlikely to be sufficient to address climate change. We
simply cannot wait for new funding to become available and new technologies to
be deployed at scale before acting.72 Moreover, as Socolow and Pacala have
demonstrated, we do not need to wait. The solution to the climate problem is
already in our grasp. What we lack is the collective will to take sufficient action
to address the problem. And it seems unlikely that we can overcome this
problem without fundamentally rethinking the institutional framework for
confronting climate change.
In trying to conceive of a transformational institution capable of effectively
addressing climate change at the national level in the United States, several
fundamental characteristics of such an institution emerge. First, it must have a
clear and ambitious mandate that is supported by scientific research. For
example, if scientists conclude that we must reduce carbon dioxide emissions
50% below current levels by 2025, then that could serve as the goal that the new
institution's program is intended to achieve. Second, the institution must be
credible. No single person is likely to offer a sufficient diversity of experience
and expertise so it will probably need to encompass several people-a Climate
Commission-comprised of talented individuals charged with developing the
program and shepherding it through the implementation process. These climate
commissioners must be trusted by the public for their integrity, their fair-
mindedness, and their scientific expertise. Third, the institution must be largely
free from political influence. From a practical and legal perspective, no
70. Rod Thompson, 'Manhattan Project' to Save Climate Urged, HONOLULU STAR-BULL.,
Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/2007/12/03/news/storyO4.html.
71. See, e.g., TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE
DEATH OF ENvIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 15 (2007).
There is simply no way we can achieve an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
without creating breakthrough technologies that do not pollute....
The transition to a clean-energy economy should be modeled not on pollution control
efforts, like the one on acid rain, but rather on past investments in infrastructure, such as
railroads and highways, as well as on research and development-microchips, medicines, and
the Internet, among other areas. This innovation-centered framework makes sense not only
for the long-term expansion of individual freedom, possibility, and choice that characterize
modem democratic nations, but also for the cultural peculiarities of the United States.
Id.
72. This is not to say that we don't need more scientific climate change research. On the
contrary, our ability to manage the impacts of climate change will depend in large measure on the
advancement of our understanding of the phenomenon, at the global, regional, and local levels. See
id at 16. See also Frances Beinecke, Why We Can't Wait for the Perfect Climate Bill, HUFFINGTON
POST.COM, July 14, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frances-beinecke/why-we-
cant-wait-for-the b_232337.html (supporting the need for immediate action to global warming).
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government institution can be entirely free from political influence since it is
politicians who will have to agree to establish any institution capable of
addressing climate change. But these politicians will have to recognize that any
significant intrusion by political forces into the decision-making process will
undermine the ability of the institution to achieve its ambitious goals. Finally, it
must have sufficient power or influence over the decision-making process to
ensure that its program is adopted.
Even if one can imagine such an institution, it is fair to ask whether it is
possible to create an institution within the bounds of the law. More specifically
does the U.S. Congress have the constitutional authority to delegate sufficient
power to an institution that is largely insulated from the political influence of
both the Congress and the President? I am skeptical. But for many years, our
courts have tolerated independent regulatory agencies that operate largely outside
the sphere of political influence. The President will almost certainly have to
appoint the members of any such independent agency,7 but once appointed they
can arguably serve for their full term without the threat that they might be
removed for political reasons.
Assuming then that it can be done, what might a Climate Commission look
like? First, it would need members appointed not for their political affiliations,
as is often done with members from independent agencies, but rather for their
scientific expertise. While both the hard and social sciences must be represented,
members would ideally be chosen because of their ability to transcend their
particular discipline. In addressing the appointment of such members, we ought
not delude ourselves into believing that scientists lack their own personal and
political biases that would influence their decisions. But we can still demand that
people appointed to any such Commission command widespread respect within
the scientific community for their experience and integrity. We should also insist
that any member appointed to the Commission be committed to achieving the
statutory goals set by Congress. To help promote the appointment of appropriate
candidates, the President should perhaps be required to appoint persons from a
pool of qualified candidates put forth by the National Academy of Sciences or
some other reputable authority.
Second, the Commission should be charged by Congress with a simple but
specific goal, and with the task of developing a program that would achieve that
goal. So, for example, the Commission might be charged with reducing
greenhouse gases by 50% over current levels by 2030. To help ensure that these
goals are met, the Congress might further require that the Commission meet
interim milestones and establish contingency plans that set more aggressive
standards if those milestones are not met.
73. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1975) (striking down the provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act that allowed the Speaker of the House and the President pre
tempore of the Senate to appoint four of the six members of the Federal Elections Commission).
74. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-26 (1935). This has not
prevented ongoing criticism of this principle. See Glenn 0. Robinson, Independent Agencies:
Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 238 & n.3 (noting the
"recurrent criticism" of the Humphrey's Executor decision).
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Third, the Congress must be prepared to delegate sufficient power to the
Climate Commission to ensure that their recommendations are given the chance
to work. This will probably be the most difficult obstacle to overcome. The
collective action problem and public choice theory make it unlikely that
Congress will be willing to cede to an independent agency the power needed to
implement fully the program that they believe is necessary to achieve their
statutory mandate. Perhaps, however, the Congress could be persuaded to
employ a model somewhat like the model that was used by the Congress to close
military bases.
As tensions over the cold war eased in the 1980s, the economic case for
closing military bases was overwhelming. But deciding which bases to close
proved an intractable political problem. Military bases provided a power boost to
local economies, and few legislators were willing to deal away the base in their
district. In 1988, in an effort to overcome the political problem associated with
closing military bases, the U.S. Congress established the Base Realignment and
Closure Commission ("BRAC"). BRAC was comprised of twelve members
appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the sole responsibility of
recommending the closure or realignment of military bases. To recommend a
base for closure the Commission had to find that the savings would exceed the
costs within six years. Most importantly, however, the list of bases
recommended for closure had to be accepted or rejected by the Secretary of
Defense in their entirety within fifteen days. If the Secretary accepted the
recommendations it was forwarded to the Congress which then had forty-five
days to pass a joint resolution disapproving the list. The resolution was subject
to a presidential veto. If no resolution was passed within forty-five days then the
closures went into effect.
The program was remarkably successful. The initial BRAC report
recommended the closure of eighty-six bases and the realignment of fifty-four
others. A motion to reject the recommendations was overwhelmingly defeated.
The program was so successful in fact that Congress used it again with similar
results in 1991, 1993, and 1995. The process saved taxpayers an estimated $5.6
billion.
It is not hard to see why BRAC succeeded where other efforts to close
military bases had failed so miserably. BRAC had a clear but narrow mandate.
The Commission was made up not of politicians, but of experts chosen by the
Secretary of Defense. And so long as the Commission was perceived to act fairly
and with integrity, the Commission's structure, whereby Congress could only
disapprove the Commission's recommendations, and then only if it acted within
forty-five days, virtually assured that its recommendations would be accepted by
the Congress.
While the problems associated with climate change are surely more complex
than a decision to close military bases, much can be learned from the success of
BRAC. In particular, a Climate Commission would be given a clear and specific
charge, it could be comprised of persons respected for their political
75. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST
POLITICs APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 1-4 (1999).
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independence and scientific expertise, and it could be granted sufficient power to
make it likely that its recommendations would be accepted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Climate change poses many difficult problems for society. One such
problem, often overlooked, is the difficulty of establishing an institutional
framework that is capable of addressing climate change in a sufficient and timely
manner. Even as we look to find the technological answers that will be needed to
address climate change, we should also consider the need to establish appropriate
political institutions. While innovative institutions are likely needed at many
levels of government, few would debate the importance of establishing a strong
institution at the national level in the United States, A carefully conceived,
federal Climate Commission might offer one of the only institutional models that
is capable of developing and gaining acceptance for the kind of comprehensive
program that will be needed to address this intractable problem. Such an
institution holds at least the possibility that scientific consensus, and rational
decision-making based upon that consensus, will drive climate policy. Unless
and until we charter an institution with the necessary resources and authority, the
prospects for a continuing political stalemate over national climate policy looms
large, and the technological solutions may that eventually emerge will likely
prove too little too late.
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